Wine-Tasting Invite, Sure Thing Bait Bite
- Javier Conejo del Cerro
- hace 3 días
- 2 Min. de lectura
In a campaign that’s as refined in disguise as it is in execution, the Russian state-sponsored group APT29 has returned to the cyber stage with a wine-tasting theme. This sophisticated threat actor is targeting European diplomatic entities with new malware: GRAPELOADER, a stealthy loader that ultimately deploys the modular backdoor WINELOADER. The attackers rely on phishing lures disguised as wine-tasting invitations—emails that appear to come from an official European Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The attack begins with what seems like a routine invitation but ends in full system compromise.
Wine and Caviar
The primary targets in this campaign are Ministries of Foreign Affairs and embassies across Europe, with some evidence suggesting the scope may extend to diplomats stationed in the Middle East. These are not arbitrary targets—they are high-level personnel engaged in sensitive diplomatic negotiations, policy coordination, and confidential communications. The attackers carefully spoofed an unnamed European Ministry to make the wine-themed invitations believable, increasing the likelihood that diplomatic staff would engage with the message. Once the ZIP file—titled “wine.zip”—is downloaded and opened, the attack sequence is triggered.
Plague in the Grapevine
The infection chain is as polished as the lure. The ZIP archive includes a legitimate PowerPoint executable (wine.exe) and a malicious DLL (ppcore.dll), alongside a dependency DLL (AppvIsvSubsystems64.dll). When the user opens the file, GRAPELOADER is launched via DLL side-loading. From there, it modifies the Windows Registry to ensure persistence and fingerprints the compromised host. Once contact with the attacker’s command-and-control server is established, the loader retrieves and installs WINELOADER—an updated modular backdoor.
WINELOADER’s job is to carry out the exfiltration of data while avoiding detection. It stealthily steals credentials, internal documents, scheduling information, and even sensitive communications. The malware achieves this using anti-analysis techniques, encrypted transmissions, and registry edits, ensuring that the compromise remains hidden from routine monitoring tools.
A Corked Defense
Protecting against such socially engineered campaigns requires more than standard endpoint protection. Organizations—especially those in the diplomatic and public sectors—should implement a layered defense strategy:
• Filter and quarantine phishing emails before they reach inboxes.
• Block execution of unknown ZIP archives and DLLs.
• Monitor PowerShell usage and Windows Registry modifications.
• Inspect scheduled tasks and other persistence mechanisms.
• Limit outbound beaconing and inspect encrypted traffic anomalies.
• Enforce sender domain validation and SPF/DKIM policies.
• Train all personnel to recognize thematic lures and verify the authenticity of event invitations.
APT29 is known not just for its technical capabilities but for its strategic patience. This latest campaign underscores the continued threat they pose to diplomatic security and the importance of preemptive defense measures.
Opmerkingen